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Abstract
Linear sketches are powerful algorithmic tools that turn an n-dimensional input into
a concise lower-dimensional representation via a linear transformation. Such sketches
have seen a wide range of applications including norm estimation over data streams,
compressed sensing, and distributed computing. In almost any realistic setting, however,
a linear sketch faces the possibility that its inputs are correlated with previous evaluations
of the sketch. Known techniques no longer guarantee the correctness of the output in
the presence of such correlations. We therefore ask: Are linear sketches inherently
non-robust to adaptively chosen inputs? We give a strong affirmative answer to this
question. Specifically, we show that no linear sketch approximates the Euclidean norm
of its input to within an arbitrary multiplicative approximation factor on a polynomial
number of adaptively chosen inputs. The result remains true even if the dimension of
the sketch is d = n − o(n) and the sketch is given unbounded computation time. Our
result is based on an algorithm with running time polynomial in d that adaptively finds
a distribution over inputs on which the sketch is incorrect with constant probability.
Our result implies several corollaries for related problems including `p-norm estimation
and compressed sensing. Notably, we resolve an open problem in compressed sensing
regarding the feasibility of `2/`2-recovery guarantees in presence of computationally
bounded adversaries.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have witnessed an explosion in the amount of available data, such as that in data
warehouses, the internet, sensor networks, and transaction logs. The need to process this data
efficiently has led to the emergence of new fields, including compressed sensing, data stream
algorithms and distributed functional monitoring. A unifying technique in these fields is the
use of linear sketches. This technique involves specifying a distribution pi over linear maps
A : Rn→ Rr for a value r  n. A matrix A is sampled from pi. Then, in the online phase, a
vector x ∈Rn is presented to the algorithm, which maintains the “sketch” Ax. This provides
a concise summary of x, from which various queries about x can be approximately answered.
The storage and number of linear measurements (rows of A) required is proportional to r.
The goal is to minimize r to well-approximate a large class of queries with high probability.
Applications of Linear Sketches. In compressed sensing the goal is to design a distribution
pi so that for A ∼ pi, given a vector x ∈ Rn, from Ax one can output a vector x′ for which
‖x − x′‖p 6 C‖xtail(k)‖q, where xtail(k) denotes x with its top k coefficients (in magnitude)
replaced with zero, p and q are norms, and C > 1 is an approximation parameter. The scheme
is considered efficient if r 6 k ·poly(logn). There are two common models, the “for all” and
“for each” models. In the “for all” model, a single A is chosen and is required, with high
probability, to work simultaneously for all x ∈Rn. In the “for each” model, the chosen A is
just required to work with high probability for any fixed x ∈Rn.
A related model is the turnstile model for data streams. Here an underlying vector x ∈Rn
is initialized to 0n and undergoes a long sequence of additive updates to its coordinates of
the form xi ← xi + δ. The algorithm is presented the updates one by one, and maintains a
summary of what it has seen. If the summary is a linear sketch Ax, then given an additive
update to the i-th coordinate, the summary can be updated by adding δAi to Ax, where Ai is
the i-th column of A. The best known algorithms for any problem in this model maintain
a linear sketch. Starting with the work of Alon, Matias, and Szegedy [AMS99], problems
such as approximating the p-norm ‖x‖p = (∑ni=1 |xi |p)1/p for 1 6 p 6 ∞ (also known as the
frequency moments), the heavy hitters or largest coordinates in x, and many others have been
considered; we refer the reader to [Ind07, Mut05]. Often it is required that the algorithm be
able to query the sketch to approximate the statistic at intermediate points in the stream,
rather than solely at the end of the stream.
Other examples include distributed computing [MFHH02] and functional monitoring
[CMY11]. Here there are k parties P 1, . . . , P k , e.g., database servers or sensor networks, each
with a local stream S i of additive updates to a vector xi . The goal is to approximate statistics,
such as those mentioned above, on the aggregate vector x =
∑k
i=1 x
i . If the parties share
public randomness, they can agree upon a sketching matrix A. Then, each party can locally
compute Axi , from which Ax can be computed using the linearity of the sketch, namely,
Ax = A(x1 + · · ·+ xk). The important measure is the communication complexity, which, since
it suffices to exchange the sketches Axi , is proportional to r rather than to n.
Adaptively Chosen Inputs. One weakness with the models above is that they assume the
sketching matrix A is independent of the input vector x. As pointed out in recent papers
[GHR+12, GHS+12], there are applications for which this is inadequate. Indeed, this occurs
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in situations for which the result of performing a query on Ax influences future updates to
the vector x. One example given in [GHR+12] is that of a grocery store, in which x consists of
transactions, and one uses Ax to approximate the best selling items. The store may update
its inventory based on Ax, which in turn influences future sales. A more adversarial example
given in [GHR+12, GHS+12] is that of using a compressed sensing radar on a ship to avoid
a missile from an attacker. Based on Ax, the ship takes evasive action, which is viewed
by the attacker, and may change the attack. The matrix A used by the radar cannot be
changed between successive attacks for efficiency reasons. Another example arises in high
frequency stock trading. Imagine Alice monitors a stream of orders on the stock market
and places her own orders depending on statistics based on sketches. A competitor Charlie
might have a commercial interest in leading Alice’s algorithm astray by observing her orders
and manipulating the input stream accordingly. The question of sketching in adversarial
environments was also introduced and motivated in the beautiful work of Mironov, Naor and
Segev [MNS08] who provide several examples arising in multiparty sketching applications.
Even from a less adversarial point of view, it seems hard to argue that in realistic settings
there will be no correlation between the inputs to a linear sketch and previous evaluations of
it. Resilience to such correlations would be a desirable robustness guarantee of a sketching
algorithm.
A deterministic sketching matrix, e.g., in compressed sensing one that satisfies the “for
all” property above, would suffice to handle this kind of feedback. Unfortunately, such
sketches provably have much weaker error guarantees. Indeed, if one wants the number r
of measurements to be on the order of k ·poly(logn), then the best one can hope for is that
for all x ∈Rn, from Ax one can output x′ for which ‖x − x′‖2 6 ε√k ‖xtail(k)‖1, which is known
as the `2/`1 error guarantee. However, if one allows the “for each” property, then there are
distributions pi over sketching matrices A for which for any fixed x ∈ Rn, from Ax one can
output x′ for which ‖x − x′‖2 6 (1 + ε)‖xtail(k)‖2 with high probability (over A ∼ pi), which
is known as the `2/`2 error guarantee. One can verify that the second guarantee is much
stronger than the first; indeed, for constant ε and k = 1, if x = (
√
n,±1,±1, . . . ,±1), then with
the `2/`1 guarantee, an output of x′ = 0n is valid, while for the `2/`2 guarantee, x′1 must either
be large or many coordinates of x′ must agree in sign with those of x.
An important open question, indeed, the first open question1 in the “Open Questions
from the Workshop on Algorithms for Data Streams 2012 at Dortmund”, is whether or not it
is possible to achieve the `2/`2 guarantee for probabilistic polynomial time adversaries with
limited information about A. The weakest possible information an adversary can have about
A is through black box queries. Formally, given a sketch Ax, there is a function f (Ax) for
which its output satisfies a given approximation guarantee with high probability, e.g., in the
case of compressed sensing, the guarantee would be that f (Ax) satisfies the `2/`2 guarantee
above, while in the case of data streams, the guarantee may be that f (Ax) = (1± ε)‖x‖p. The
adversary only sees values f (Ax1), f (Ax2), . . . , f (Axt) for a sequence of vectors x1, . . . ,xt of her
choice, where xi may depend on x1, . . . ,xi−1 and f (Ax1), . . . , f (Axi−1). The goal of the adversary
is to find a vector x for which f (Ax) does not satisfy the approximation guarantee. This
corresponds to the private model of compressed sensing, given in Definition 3 of [GHS+12].
1See http://ls2-www.cs.tu-dortmund.de/streamingWS2012/slides/open.problems_dortmund2012.
pdf
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1.1 Our Results
We resolve the above open question in the negative. In fact, we prove a much more general
result about linear sketches. All of our results are derived from the following promise
problem GapNorm(B): for an input vector x ∈ Rn, output 0 if ‖x‖2 6 1 and output 1 if
‖x‖2 > B, where B > 1 is a parameter. If x satisfies neither of these two conditions, the output
of the algorithm is allowed to be 0 or 1.
Our main theorem is stated informally as follows.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal version of Theorem 5.13). There is a randomized algorithm which, given
a parameter B > 2 and oracle access to a linear sketch that uses at most r = n−O(log(nB)) rows,
with high probability finds a distribution over queries on which the linear sketch fails to solve
GapNorm(B) with constant probability.
The algorithm makes at most poly(rB) adaptively chosen queries to the oracle and runs in time
poly(rB). Moreover, the algorithm uses only r “rounds of adaptivity” in that the query sequence
can be partitioned into at most r sequences of non-adaptive queries.
Note that the algorithm in our theorem succeeds on every linear sketch with high proba-
bility. In particular, our theorem implies that one cannot design a distribution over sketching
matrices with at most r rows so as to output a value in the range [‖x‖2,B‖x‖2], that is, a
B-approximation to ‖x‖2, and be correct with constant probability on an adaptively chosen se-
quence of poly(rB) queries. This is unless the number r of rows in the sketch is n−O(log(nB)),
which agrees with the trivial r = n upper bound up to a low order term. Here B can be
any arbitrary approximation factor that is only required to be polynomially bounded in
n (as otherwise the running time would not be polynomial). An interesting aspect of our
algorithm is that it makes arguably very natural queries as they are all drawn from Gaussian
distributions with varying covariance structure.
We also note that the second part of our theorem implies that the queries can be grouped
into fewer than r rounds, where in each round the queries made are independent of each
other conditioned on previous rounds. This is close to optimal, as if o(r/ logr) rounds were
used, the sketching algorithm could partition the rows of A into o(r/ logr) disjoint blocks
of ω(logr) coordinates, and use the i-th block alone to respond to queries in the i-th round.
If the rows of A were i.i.d. normal random variables, one can show that this would require
a super-polynomial (in r) number of non-adaptive queries to break, even for constant B.
Moreover, our theorem gives an algorithm with time complexity polynomial in r and B,
and therefore rules out the possibility of using cryptographic techniques secure against
polynomial time algorithms.
We state our results in terms of algorithms that output any computationally unbounded
but deterministic function f of the sketch Ax. However, it is not difficult to extend all of our
results to the setting where the algorithm can use additional internal randomness at each
step to output a randomized function f of Ax. This is discussed in Section 7.1.
Applications. We next discuss several implications of our main theorem. Our algorithm
in fact uses only query vectors x which are O(r)-dimensional for B 6 exp(r). Recall that for
such vectors, Ω(r−1/2‖x‖2) 6 ‖x‖p 6O(r1/2‖x‖2), for all 1 6 p 6∞. This gives us the following
corollary for any `p-norm.
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Corollary 1.2 (Informal). No linear sketch with n−ω(logn) rows approximates the `p-norm to
within a fixed polynomial factor on a sequence of polynomially many adaptively chosen queries.
The corollary also applies to other problems that are as least as hard as `p-norm estimation,
such as the earthmover distance, or that can be embedded into `p with small distortion.
Via a reduction to GapNorm(B), we are able to resolve the aforementioned open question
for sparse recovery, even when k = 1.
Corollary 1.3 (Informal). Let C > 1. No linear sketch with o(n/C2) rows guarantees `2/`2-
recovery on a polynomial number of adaptively chosen inputs. More precisely, we can find with
probability 2/3 an input x for which the output x′ of the sketch does not satisfy ‖x − x′‖2 6
C‖xtail(1)‖2.
For constant approximation factors C, this shows one cannot do asymptotically better
than storing the entire input. For larger approximation factors C, the dependence of the
number of rows on C in this corollary is essentially best possible (at least for small k), as we
point out in Section 7.3.
Connection to Differential Privacy. How might one design algorithms that are robust
to adversarial inputs? An intriguing approach is offered by the notion of differential
privacy [DMNS06]. Indeed, differential privacy is designed to guard a private database
D ∈ {0,1}n (here thought of as n private bits) against adversarial and possibly adaptive
queries from a data analyst. Intuitively speaking, differential privacy prevents an attacker
from reconstructing the private bit string. In our setting we can think of D as the random
string that encodes the matrix used by the sketching algorithm and indeed our algorithm is
precisely a reconstruction attack in the terminology of differential privacy. It is known that ifD
is chosen uniformly at random, then after conditioning D on the output of an ε-differentially
private algorithm, the string D is a strongly 2ε-unpredictable2 random string [MMP+10].
Hence, if the answers given by the sketching algorithm satisfy differential privacy, then the
attacker cannot learn the randomness used by the sketching algorithm. This could then be
used to argue that the sketch continues to be correct.
An interesting corollary of our work is that it rules out the possibility of correctly an-
swering a polynomial number of “GapNorm queries” using the differential privacy approach
outlined above. This stands in sharp contrast to work in differential privacy which shows that
a nearly exponential number of adaptive and adversarial “counting queries” can be answered
while satisfying differential privacy [RR10, HR10]. A similar (though quantitatively sharper)
separation was recently shown for the stateless mechanisms [DNV12] answering counting
queries. While linear sketches are stateless, the model we use here in principle permits more
flexibility in how the randomness is used by the algorithm so that the previous separation
does not apply.
1.2 Comparison to Previous Work
While the above papers [GHR+12, GHS+12] introduce the problem, the results they obtain do
not directly address the general problem. The main result of [GHS+12] is that in the private
2This means that each bit of D is at most 2ε-biased conditioned on the remaining bits.
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model of compressed sensing, the `2/`2 error guarantee is achievable with r = k ·poly(logn)
measurements, under the assumption that the algorithm has access to the exact value of ‖x‖22
as well as specific Fourier coefficients of x (or approximate values to these quantities that
come from a distribution that depends only on the exact values). While in some applications
this may be possible, it is not hard to show that this assumption cannot be realized by any
linear sketch unless r > n (nor by any low space streaming algorithm or low communication
protocol). The main result in [GHR+12] relevant to this problem is that if the adversary
can read the sketching matrix A, but is required to stream through the entries in a single
pass using logarithmic space, then it cannot generate a query x for which the output of the
algorithm on Ax does not satisfy the `2/`2 error guarantee. This is quite different from the
problem considered here, since we consider multiple adaptively chosen queries rather than a
single query, and we do not allow direct access to A but rather only observe A through the
outputs f (Axi).
We note that other work has observed the danger of using the output f (Ax) to create
an input x′ for which the value f (Ax′) is used [AGM12a, AGM12b]. Their solution to this
problem is just to use a new sketching matrix A′ drawn from pi, and instead query f (A′x′). As
mentioned, it may not be possible to do this, e.g., if x′ is a perturbation to x, one would need
to compute A′x′ without knowing x′ (since x may only be known through the sketch Ax).
Other work [IPW11, PW13] has also considered the power of adaptively choosing matrices
to achieve fewer measurements in compressed sensing; this is orthogonal to our work since
we consider adaptively chosen inputs rather than adaptively chosen sketches.
Sketching in adversarial environments was also the motivation for [MNS08]. However,
they consider an adversarial multi-party model that is different from ours.
1.3 Our Techniques and Proof Overview
We prove our main theorem by considering the following game between two parties, Alice
and Bob. Alice chooses an r × n matrix A from distribution pi. Bob makes a sequence of
queries x1, . . . ,xs ∈ Rn to Alice, who only sees Axi on query i. Alice responds by telling
Bob the value f (Axi). We stress that here f is an arbitrary function here that need not be
efficiently computable, but for now we assume that f uses no randomness. This restriction
can be removed easily as we show later. Bob’s goal is to learn the row space R(A) of Alice,
namely the at most r-dimensional subspace of Rn spanned by the rows of A. If Bob knew
R(A), he could, with probability 1/2 query 0n and with probability 1/2 query a vector in the
kernel of A. Since Alice cannot distinguish the two cases, and since the norm in one case is 0
and in the other case non-zero, she cannot provide a relative error approximation. Our main
theorem gives an algorithm (which can be executed efficiently by Bob) that learns r −O(1)
orthonormal vectors that are almost contained in R(A). While this does not give Bob a vector
in the kernel of A, it effectively reduces Alice’s row space to be constant dimensional thus
forcing her to make a mistake on sufficiently many queries.
The conditional expectation lemma. In order to learn R(A), Bob’s initial query is drawn
from the multivariate normal distribution N (0, τIn), where τIn is the covariance matrix,
which is just a scalar τ times the identity matrix In. This ensures that Alice’s view of Bob’s
query x, namely, the projection PAx of x onto R(A), is spherically symmetric, and so only
depends on ‖PAx‖2. Given ‖PAx‖2, Alice needs to output 0 or 1 depending on what she thinks
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the norm of x is. The intuition is that since Alice has a proper subspace of Rn, she will be
confused into thinking x has larger norm than it does when ‖PAx‖2 is slightly larger than its
expectation (for a given τ), that is, when x has a non-trivial correlation with R(A). Formally,
we can prove a conditional expectation lemma showing that there exists a choice of τ for
whichEx∼N (0,τIdr )
[
‖PAx‖22 | f (Ax) = 1
]
−Ex∼N (0,τIdr )
[
‖PAx‖22
]
is non-trivially large. This is done
by showing that the sum of this difference over all possible τ in a range [1,B] is noticeably
positive. Here B is the approximation factor that we tolerate. In particular, there exists a
τ for which this difference is large. To show the sum is large, for each possible condition
v = ‖PAx‖22, there is a probability q(v) that the algorithm outputs 1, and as we range over all
τ , q(v) contributes both positively and negatively to the above difference based on v’s weight
in the χ2-distribution with mean r · τ . The overall contribution of v can be shown to be zero.
Moreover, by correctness of the sketch, q(v) must typically be close to 0 for small values of v,
and typically close to 1 for large values of v. Therefore q(v) zeros out some of the negative
contributions that v would otherwise make and ensures some positive contributions in total.
Boosting a small correlation. Given the conditional expectation lemma we we can find
many independently chosen xi for which each xi has a slightly increased expected projection
onto Alice’s space R(A). At this point, however, it is not clear how to proceed unless we can
aggregate these slight correlations into a single vector which has very high correlation with
R(A). We accomplish this by arranging all m = poly(n) positively labeled vectors xi into an
m× n matrix G and computing the top right singular vector v∗ of G. Note that this can be
done efficiently. We show that, indeed, ‖PAv∗‖ > 1− 1/poly(n). In other words v∗ is almost
entirely contained in R(A). This step is crucial as it gives us a way to effectively reduce the
dimension of Alice’s space by 1 as we will see next.
Iterating the attack. After finding one vector inside Alice’s space, we are unfortunately
not done. In fact Alice might initially use only a small fraction of her rows and switch to a
new set of rows after Bob learned her initial rows. We thus iterate the previously described
attack as follows. Bob now makes queries from a multivariate normal distribution inside of
the subspace orthogonal to the the previously found vector. In this way we have effectively
reduced the dimension of Alice’s space by 1, and we can repeat the attack until her space is
of constant dimension, at which point a standard non-adaptive attack is enough to break the
sketch. Several complications arise at this point. For example, each vector that we find is only
approximately contained in R(A). We need to rule out that this approximation error could
help Alice. We do so by adding a sufficient amount of global Gaussian noise to our query
distribution. This has the effect of making the distribution statistically indistinguishable
from a query distribution defined by vectors that are exactly contained in Alice’s space. Of
course, we then also need a generalized conditional expectation lemma for such distributions.
Paper Outline
We start with some technical preliminaries in Section 2. We then prove the conditional
expectation lemma in Section 4. The proof of this lemma requires rather detailed information
about averages of χ2-distributions in certain intervals. The development of these bounds is
contained in Section 3. In Section 5 we present and analyze our complete adaptive attack.
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The proof again requires several technical ingredients. One tool (given in Section 4.2) relates
a distance function between two subspaces to the statistical distance of certain distributions
that we use in our attack. The other tool in Section 6 analyzes the top singular vector of
certain biased Gaussian matrices arising in our attack. In Section 7 we give applications to
compressed sensing, data streams, and distributed functional monitoring.
2 Preliminaries
Notation. Given a subspace V ⊆ Rn, we denote by PV the orthogonal projection operator
onto the space V . The orthogonal complement of a linear space V is denoted by V ⊥. When X
is a distribution we use x ∼ X to indicate that x is a random variable drawn according to the
distribution X.
Linear Sketches. A linear sketch is given by a distributionM over r × n matrices and an
evaluation mapping F : Rr×n ×Rr → R where R is some output space which we typically
choose to be R = {0,1}. The algorithm initially samples a matrix A ∼M. The answer to each
query x ∈ Rn is then given by F(A,Ax). Since the evaluation map F is not restricted in any
way, the concrete representation of A as a matrix is not important. We will therefore identify
A with its image, an r-dimensional subspace of Rn (w.l.o.g. A has full row rank). In this
case, we can write an instance of a sketch as a mapping f : Rn→ R satisfying the identity
f (x) = f (PAx). In this case we may write f : A→ {0,1} even though f is defined on all of Rn
via orthogonal projection onto A.
Distributions. We denote the d-dimensional Gaussian distribution with mean µ ∈Rd and
independent coordinates with variance σ2 ∈R by N (µ,σ2)d . The statistical distance (or total
variation distance) between two distributions X,Y is denoted by ‖X −Y ‖tv.
3 Certain Averages of χ2-distributions
In this section we develop the main technical ingredients for our conditional expectation
lemma. Specifically, we will work inRd and consider weighted averages of the χ2-distribution
in certain intervals. The density function of the squared Euclidean norm of a d-dimensional
standard Gaussian variable is given by ν(s) = sd/2−1e−s/2/2d/2Γ (d/2).We let ντ,d : [0,∞)→ [0,1]
be the density function of a χ2-distribution with d-degrees of freedom and expectation τ.
Note that this coincides with the density function of the squared norm of a d-dimensional
Gaussian variable N (0, τ/d)d which we will denote as:
ντ,d(s) =
d
(
sd
τ
)d/2−1
e− sd2τ
τ2d/2Γ (d/2)
. (1)
Here we used that ντ,d(s) = dν(sd/τ)/τ. We will omit the subscript d whenever it is clear
from the context. Further, let Γd denote the probability measure on [0,∞) of the Gamma
distribution given by the density γd : (0,∞)→ [0,1],
γd(x) =
xd−1e−x
Γ (d)
. (2)
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Lemma 3.1. Let 0 6 a 6 b and let s > 0. Then,∫ b
a
sντ (s)dτ =
s
1− 2/d Γd/2−1
([
sd
2b
,
sd
2a
])
(3)∫ b
a
τντ (s)dτ =
s
1− 6/d + 8/d2 · Γd/2−2
([
sd
2b
,
sd
2a
])
. (4)
Proof. Applying Equation 1 and substituting x = sd/2τ, we have dxdτ = − sd2τ2 = −2x
2
sd . It follows
that 1τ dτ = −1x dx. Put a′ = sd/2b and b′ = sd/2a. Thus,∫ b
a
ντ (s)dτ =
∫ b
a
d
(
sd
τ
)d/2−1
e− sd2τ
τ2d/2Γ (d/2)
dτ =
∫ b′
a′
dxd/2−2e−x
2Γ (d/2)
dx .
On the other hand, Γ (d/2) = (d/2− 1)Γ (d/2− 1) . Hence,∫ b
a
ντ (s)dτ =
d
2(d/2− 1)Γd/2−1 (
[
a′ ,b′]) = (1 + 2
d − 2
)
Γd/2−1 (
[
a′ ,b′]) .
The second equation is shown similarly, again substituting x = sd/2τ and noting that dτ =
− sd2x2 dx,∫ b
a
τντ (s)dτ =
∫ b
a
d
(
sd
τ
)d/2−1
e− sd2τ
2d/2Γ (d/2)
dτ =
∫ b′
a′
sd2
4
· x
d/2−3e−x
Γ (d/2)
dx =
sd2Γd/2−2 ([a′ ,b′])
4(d/2− 1)(d/2− 2) .
Furthermore,
d2
4(d/2− 1)(d/2− 2) =
1
4(1/4− 1/2d − 1/d + 2/d2) =
1
(1− 6/d + 8/d2)

Let us introduce the function ∆ : [0,∞)→R>0, defined as
∆(s) def=
∫ Bd
d
(s − τ)ντ (s)dτ . (5)
Here B > 4 is some parameter that we will choose later. Figure 1 illustrates the behavior of
this function. The next lemma states the properties of ∆ that we will need.
Lemma 3.2. Assume d > 20. Then, for every s ∈ [0,Bd/2], we have that ∆(s) < 0. Moreover, for
every s ∈ [d,2d], we have ∆(s) < −s/3d.
Proof. First consider the case where s ∈ [2d,Bd/2]. By Lemma 3.1, we have
∆(s) =
s
1− 2/d Γd/2−1
([ s
2B
,
s
2
])
− s
1− 6/d + 8/d2 · Γd/2−2
([ s
2B
,
s
2
])
On the other hand, for this choice of s, we have
Γd/2−2
([ s
2B
,
s
2
])
> Γd/2−2
([
d
4
,d
])
> 1− 1/d
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Figure 1: ∆(s) plotted for d = 20 and B = 4.
Here, the last step can be verified directly by using that Γd/2−2 is strongly concentrated around
its mean d/2− 2 and has variance bounded by √d. For d > 20, the approximation we used is
valid. Hence,
∆(s) 6 s
(
1
1− 2/d −
1− 1/d
1− 6/d + 8/d2
)
= a
(
1− 1/d
1− 3/d + 2/d2 −
1− 1/d
1− 6/d + 8/d2
)
< − s
d
.
Here we used our lower bound on d again.
Now consider the case s ∈ [d−4,2d]. In this case we have Γd/2−2([s/2B,s/2]) > Γd/2−2([d/B,d/2−
2]) > 1/2 − 1/d by concentration bounds for Γ and using that the median of Γd/2−2 is at
most d/2 − 2. For the same reason, Γd/2−2([s/2B,s/2]) > 1/2 − 1/d. Moreover, we have that
Γd/2−2([s/2B,s/2]) > Γd/2−1([s/2B,s/2]) because Γd/2−1([d/2 − 2,∞)) > Γd/2−2([d/2 − 2,∞]). This
follows because Γd/2−1 has larger mean and greater variance than Γd/2−2. Hence,
∆(s) > s(1/2− 1/d)
( 1
1− 2/d −
1
1− 6/d + 8/d2
)
6 − s
2d
+
s
d2
6 − s
3d
.
Finally, let s ∈ [0,d − 4]. In this case we have [s/2B,s/2] ⊆ [0,d/2 − 2]. But, for every
x ∈ [0,d/2− 2], we have
γd/2−2(x) = γd/2−1(x)
(
d/2− 2
x
)
> γd/2−1(x) .
Hence, ∆(s) < 0.

Our main lemma in this section is stated next.
Lemma 3.3. Let d > d0 for a sufficiently large constant d0. Let B > 4. Let h : [0,∞)→ [0,1] be any
function satisfying the properties:
1.
∫ 2Bd
Bd/2(1− h(s))ds 6 1/Bd,
2.
∫ 2d
0 h(s)ds 6 1/d.
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Then, we have ∫ ∞
s=0
∫ u
τ=l
(s − τ)ντ (s)h(s)dτ ds > d4 . (6)
Proof. First observe that∫ ∞
s=0
∫ u
τ=l
(s − τ)ντ (s)h(s)dτ ds =
∫ ∞
s=0
h(s)∆(s)ds
Moreover, since
∫∞
0 sντ (s)ds = τ, we have∫ ∞
s=0
∆(s) = 0 . (7)
Let us consider the three intervals
L = [0,2d), M = [2d,Bd/2), U = [t,∞).
Claim 3.4. Without loss of generality,
∫
M
h(s)∆(s)ds >
∫
M
∆(s)ds
Proof. Lemma 3.2 tells us that ∆(s) < 0 for all s ∈M. Since we’re interested in lower bounding∫∞
s=0h(s)∆(s), we can therefore assume without loss of generality that h(s) = 1 for all s ∈M. 
Claim 3.5.
∫
U
h(s)∆(s)ds >
∫
U
∆(s)ds − 6 .
Proof. The claim follows from the first condition on h which implies that h(s) = 1 almost
everywhere in the interval I = [Bd/2,2Bd]. In particular,∫
I
h(s)∆(s)ds =
∫
I
∆(s)ds+
∫
I
(1− h(s))∆(s)ds
>
∫
I
∆(s)ds − 1
Bd
max
s∈I |∆(s)| >
∫
I
∆(s)ds − 4 .
Here we used that |∆(s)| 6 4Bd.Moreover, for every τ ∈ [d,Bd] we have that ∫[2Bd,∞) τντ (s)ds 6
1/2Bd by standard tail bounds for ντ and sufficiently large d0. This implies∫
U
h(s)∆(s)ds >
∫
I
h(s)∆(s)ds − 1 .
Similarly,
∫
I
∆(s) >
∫
U
∆(s)− 1. The claim follows by combining these statements. 
Claim 3.6.
∫
L
h(s)∆(s)ds >
∫
L
∆(s) + d/3− 4.
Proof. Here we use the second condition on the claim which implies∫
L
h(s)∆(s)ds > −max
L
|∆(s)|
∫
L
h(s) > −4 ,
where we used that |∆(s)| 6 4d in this range. On the other hand, by Lemma 3.2, ∆(s) < 0 for
all s ∈ L and for s ∈ [d,2d] we have ∆(s) < −s/3d. Hence,∫
L
∆(s)ds 6 − 1
3d
∫ 2d
d
sds 6 −d
3
.

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Combining all three claims we get∫ ∞
0
h(s)∆(s)ds >
∫ ∞
0
∆(s)ds+
d
3
− 10 = d
3
− 10 ,
where we used Equation 7 in the last step. For sufficiently large d, we have d/3− 10 > d/4
and the lemma follows. 
4 Conditional Expectation Lemma
The key tool in our algorithm is what we call the conditional expectation lemma. Informally,
it shows that we can always find a distribution over inputs that have a non-trivially large
correlation with the unknown subspace used by the linear sketch. Our presentation here,
however, will not need the interpretation in terms of linear sketches. Fix a d-dimensional
linear subspace U ⊆Rn. Throughout this section, we think of d as being lower bounded by
a sufficiently large constant. We will consider functions of the type f : Rn → {0,1} which
satisfy the identity f (x) = f (PUx) for all x ∈ Rn. To indicate that this identity holds we will
write f : U → {0,1}. As explained in Section 2, we can think of these functions as instances of
a linear sketch. Our presentation here will not need this fact though.
Definition 4.1 (Subspace Gaussian). Let U ⊆ Rn be a linear subspace of Rn. We say that a
family of distributions G(U ) = {gτ }τ∈(0,∞) is a subspace Gaussian family if
1. PUgτ is distributed like a standard Gaussian variable inside U satisfying E‖PUgτ‖2 = τ.
2. PU⊥gτ is a spherical Gaussian distribution that does not depend on τ and is moreover
statistically independent of PUgτ .
Lemma 4.2. The norm ‖PUgτ‖2 is a sufficient statistic for a subspace Gaussian family G(U ) =
{gτ }τ . Formally, for every s > 0, the distribution of gτ is independent of τ under the condition that
s = ‖PUgτ‖2.
Remark 4.3. The reader concerned about the condition ‖PUgτ‖2 = s (which has probability 0
under gτ) is referred to the excellent article of Chang and Pollard [CP97] (Example 6) where it is
shown how to formally justify this conditional distribution using the notion of a disintegration.
Specifically, here we mean that the distributions gτ have a joint disintegration in terms of the
variable ‖PUgτ‖2. As explained in [CP97], we can prove the above lemma by appealing to the
factorization theorem for sufficient statistics described therein.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Note that gτ = g1 + g2 where g2 is some distribution independent of τ
supported on U⊥ and g1 is supported on U. By spherical symmetry of both g1 and g2 we may
assume without loss of generality that U is a coordinate subspace, say, the first d = dim(U )
coordinates of the standard basis. Since g is independent of gτ and supported on a disjoint set
of coordinates, it suffices to verify the claim for g1. Specifically, by the Factorization theorem
for sufficient statistics (see [CP97]), we need to show that the density of g1 can be factored
into the product of two functions such f (x) and hτ (x) that f does not depend on τ and hτ (x)
depends on τ but is a function of the parameter ‖x‖2. This follows directly from the fact that
the Gaussian density at a point x depends only on ‖x‖2. 
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The following definition captures the condition that f should evaluate to 1 on inputs that
have large norm and should evaluate to 0 on inputs that have small norm.
Definition 4.4 (Soundness). We say that a function f : U → {0,1} is B-sound for a subspace
Gaussian family G(U ), where dim(U ) = d, if it satisfies the requirements:
1.
∫ 2Bd
Bd/2E
[
f (gτ ) | ‖PUgτ‖2 = s
]
ds 6 1/Bd .
2.
∫ 2d
0 E
[
f (gτ ) | ‖PUgτ‖2 = s
]
ds 6 1/d.
We are ready to state and prove the Conditional Expectation Lemma.
Lemma 4.5. Let B > 4. Let G(U ) be a subspace Gaussian family whereU has dimension sufficiently
large dimension d > d0. Suppose f : U → {0,1} is B-sound for G(U ). Then, there exists τ ∈ [d,Bd]
such that
1. E
[
‖PUgτ‖2
∣∣∣∣f (gτ ) = 1] > E [‖PUgτ‖2]+ 14B
2. P {f (gτ ) = 1} > 140B2d .
Proof. Define the function h : (0,∞)→R by putting
h(s) = E
[
f (gτ ) | ‖PUgτ‖2 = s
]
. (8)
Note that this is well-defined by Lemma 4.2. Let us first rewrite the conditional expectation
as follows.
E
[
‖PUgτ‖2
∣∣∣∣f (gτ ) = 1] = ∫ ∞
0
sP
{
‖PUgτ‖2 = s | f (gτ ) = 1
}
ds
=
∫ ∞
0
sP
{
f (gτ ) = 1 | ‖PUgτ‖2 = s
}
· ντ (s)
P {f (gτ ) = 1} ds (by Bayes’ rule)
=
∫ ∞
0
sh(s)ντ (s)
P {f (gτ ) = 1} ds
Note that here and in the following ντ = ντ,d , i.e., the χ2-distribution has d degrees of
freedom corresponding to the dimension of U.
Claim 4.6. The lemma follows from follows from the following inequality:∫ u
l
∫ ∞
0
(s − τ)ντ (s)h(s)dsdτ > d4 . (9)
Proof. Indeed, assuming the above inequality, it follows that there must be a τ ∈ [d,Bd] such
that ∫ ∞
0
sντ (s)h(s)ds > τ
∫ ∞
0
ντ (s)h(s)ds+
d
4Bd
= τP {f (gτ ) = 1}+ 14B .
In particular,
E
[
‖PUgτ‖2
∣∣∣∣f (gτ ) = 1] = ∫ ∞
0
sh(s)ντ (s)
P {f (gτ ) = 1} ds >
τP {f (gτ ) = 1}+ 1/4B
P {f (gτ ) = 1} > τ +
1/4B
P {f (gτ ) = 1} .
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Since P {f (gτ ) = 1} 6 1, this gives us the first conclusion of the lemma. It remains to lower
bound P {f (gτ ) = 1} . Here we use that
∫∞
5Bd sντ (s)h(s)ds 6
1
2
∫∞
0 sντ (s)h(s)ds, by standard con-
centration properties of ντ . Hence,
P {f (gτ ) = 1} =
∫ ∞
0
ντ (s)h(s)ds >
1
10Bd
∫ ∞
0
sντ (s)h(s)ds >
1/4B
10Bd
=
1
40B2d
.

By the previous claim, it suffices to prove Equation 9. To do so we will apply Lemma 3.3.
The lemma in fact directly implies the claim, if we can show that h satisfies the properties
required in Lemma 3.3. It is easily verified that these properties coincide with the soundness
assumption on f . Thus, ∫ u
l
∫ ∞
0
(s − τ)ντ (s)h(s)dsdτ > d3 − 2 >
d
4
.
This concludes the proof of Lemma 4.5. 
The following corollary is a direct consequence of Lemma 4.5 that states that there is one
direction in the subspace that has increased variance.
Corollary 4.7. Let G(U ) satisfy the assumptions of Lemma 4.5. Then, there is τ ∈ [d,Bd] and a
vector u ∈U, satisfying,
1. E
[
〈u,gτ〉2
∣∣∣∣f (gτ ) = 1] > E [〈u,gτ〉2]+ 14Bd
2. P {f (gτ ) = 1} > 140B2d .
Proof. Pick an arbitrary orthonormal basis u1, . . . ,ud of U. Since ‖PUgτ‖2 = ∑di=1〈ui , gτ〉2, one
of the basis vectors must satisfy the conclusion of the lemma by an averaging argument. 
4.1 Noisy orthogonal complements
In this section we extend the conditional expectation lemma to a family of distributions that
will be important to us later on. We will fix a r-dimensional subspace A ⊆Rn. The family of
distributions we will define next isn’t subspace Gaussian on A, but rather subspace Gaussian
on A∩V ⊥, where V ⊆ A is a linear subspace of A of dimension dim(V ) 6 d − 1.
A distribution in this family is given by a subspace V and a variance σ2. Intuitively, the
distribution corresponds to a Gaussian distribution on the subspace V ⊥ of variance σ2 plus a
small Gaussian supported on all of Rn of constant variance independent of σ2. The formal
definition is given next.
Definition 4.8. Let σ > 0. Given a subspace V ⊆ A of dimension t 6 r − 1 and let d =
r − t. We define the distribution G(V ⊥,σ2) as the distribution obtained from sampling g1 ∼
N (0,σ2)n, g2 ∼N (0,1/4)n independently outputting g = PV ⊥g1 + g2.
Further we define the family of distributions G(A∩V ⊥) = {gτ } by letting gτ = PAg where
g ∼ G(V ⊥, τ/d − 1/4) if τ/d > 1/4 and otherwise we put gτ = PAg where g ∼ N (0, τ/d)n
otherwise.
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The next lemma confirms that G(A∩V ⊥) is subspace Gaussian.
Lemma 4.9. G(A∩V ⊥) is a subspace Gaussian family.
Proof. Let U = A∩V ⊥. For τ 6 1/4, it is clear that E‖PUgτ‖2 = dτ/d = τ as is required and
‖PU⊥gτ‖ = 0. For τ > 1/4, recall that g = PV ⊥g1 + g2. Hence, inside PUg is distributed like a
spherical Gaussian with variance τ/d in each direction. In particular,
‖PUgτ‖2 = ‖PU (g1 + g2)‖2 = dτ/d = τ .
On the other hand, PU⊥g only depends on g2 and is hence independent of τ. This shows the
second property of subspace Gaussian. 
The next definition captures the correctness requirement on f for inputs drawn from the
distribution G(V ⊥,σ2).
Definition 4.10 (Correctness). We say that a function f : A→ {0,1} is (ε,B)-correct on V ⊥
with d = dim(V ⊥ ∩A) if:
1. for all σ2 ∈ [B/2,2B] and g ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) we have P {f (g) = 1} > 1− ε
2. for all σ2 ∈ [0,2] and g ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) we have P {f (g) = 1} 6 ε.
We say that f is B-correct on V ⊥ if it is (ε,B)-correct for some ε 6 1/10(Bd)2.
We will now relate the correctness definition to our earlier soundness definition.
Lemma 4.11. If f is B-correct on V ⊥, then f is B-sound for G(A∩V ⊥).
Proof. We will prove the claim in its contrapositive. Indeed suppose that f is not B-
sound for G(A ∩ V ⊥). This means that one of the two requirements in Definition 4.4 is
not satisfied. Suppose it is the first one. In this case we know that for I = [Bd/2,2Bd]
and h(s) = P
{
f (gτ ) = 1 | ‖gτ‖2 = s
}
, we have Es∈I (1 − h(s)) > 1/2(Bd)2. Suppose we sample
g ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) where σ2 is chosen uniformly at random from B/2,2B. We claim that that the
distribution of ‖g‖2 is pointwise within a factor 5 of the uniform distribution inside the inter-
val [B/2,2B]. Hence, Eh(‖g‖2) > 1/10(Bd)2. This violates the first condition of correctness.
The case where the second requirement of Definition 4.4 is violated follows from an
analogous argument. 
Below we state a variant of the conditional expectation lemma for distributions of the
above form. Moreover, we will remove the requirement that t 6 r − d0 and obtain a result
that applies to any t 6 dim(A).
Lemma 4.12. Let A ⊆ Rn be a subspace of dimension dim(A) = r 6 n− d0 for some sufficiently
large constant d0. Let V ⊆ A be a subspace of A of dimension t 6 r. Suppose that f : A→ {0,1} is
(1/10(d0B)2,B)-correct on V ⊥. Then, there exists a scalar σ2 ∈ [3/4,B], and a vector u ∈ A∩V ⊥
such that for g ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) we have for d = max{r − d,d0} :
1. E
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] > E [〈u,g〉2]+ 14Bd
2. P {f (g) = 1} > 140B2d .
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Proof. Before we proceed we would like to ensure that dim(A∩V ⊥) is at least a sufficiently
large constant d0. This can be ensured without loss of generality by considering instead a
subspace A′ ⊇ A of dimension r + d0 obtained by extending A arbitrarily to r + d0 dimensions.
This can be done since n > r +d0. Define the function f ′(x) = f (PAx). Note that f ′(x) = f (x) on
all x ∈Rn. Hence, f ′ is still (1/10(d0B)2,B)-correct on V ⊥. Moreover, now dim(V ⊥ ∩A) = d0.
Hence, by Lemma 4.11, we have that f is sound for the subspace Gaussian family G(A′ ∩V ⊥).
Let U = A′ ∩V ⊥. We can apply Corollary 4.7 to G(U ) to conclude that there is τ ∈ [d,Bd] and
u ∈U such that
E
[
〈u,gτ〉2
∣∣∣∣f ′(gτ ) = 1] > E [〈u,gτ〉2]+ 14Bd
and P {f ′(gτ ) = 1} > 140B2d . By definition of f ′ the condition f ′(gτ ) = 1 is equivalent to f (gτ ) =
1. The condition f (gτ ) = 1 does not affect any vector that is orthogonal to A. Hence we may
assume that u ∈ A∩V ⊥. Also note that gτ = PA′g for some g ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) with σ2 ∈ [3/4,B].
Moreover, f (g) = f ′(gτ ), and also 〈u,gτ〉 = 〈u,g〉 since u ∈U. Hence, we have
E
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] > E [〈u,g〉2]+ 14Bd
with P {f (g) = 1} > 140B2d . This is what we wanted to show. 
4.2 Distance between subspaces
Our goal is to relate distributions of the form G(V ⊥,σ2) to G(W⊥,σ2) where V and W are
subspaces. For this purpose, we consider the following distance function d(V ,W ) between
two subspaces V ,W ⊆Rn :
d(V ,W ) = ‖PV − PW ‖2 = sup
v∈Rn
‖PV v − PW v‖
‖v‖ . (10)
We will show that if V and W are close in this distance measure, then the two distributions
G(V ⊥,σ2) and G(W⊥,σ2) are statistically close. Recall that we denote the statistical distance
between two distributions X,Y by ‖X −Y ‖tv. We need the following well-known fact.
Fact 4.13. Let v ∈Rn. Then,
‖N (0,σ2)n −N (v,σ2)n‖tv 6 ‖v‖σ .
Using this fact we can express the statistical distance between G(V ⊥,σ2) and G(W⊥,σ2)
for two subspaces V ,W in terms of the distance d(V ,W ).
Lemma 4.14. For every σ2 ∈ (0,B], we have
‖G(V ⊥,σ2)−G(W⊥,σ2)‖tv 6 20
√
Bn log(Bn) · d(V ,W ) + 1
(Bn)5
.
Proof. Sample g1 ∼ N (0,σ2)n and g2, g ′2 ∼ N (0,1/4)n independently. Let us denote by x =
PV ⊥g1+g2 and by y = PW⊥g1+g ′2.Note that x is distributed like a random draw fromG(V ⊥,σ2)
and y like a draw from G(W⊥,σ2). However, we introduced a dependence throw g1. Note
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that it is sufficient to bound the statistical distance of these coupled variables. On the one
hand,
‖PV ⊥g1 − PW⊥g1‖ = ‖PV g1 − PW g1‖ 6 ‖g1‖ · d(V ,W )
On the other hand, by Gaussian concentration bounds,
P
{
‖g1‖ 6 10
√
Bn log(Bn)
}
6
1
(Bn)5
.
Condition on ‖g1‖ 6 10
√
Bn log(Bn). Under this condition, for every possible value u =
PV ⊥g1 − PW⊥g1, we have
‖N (u,1/4)n −N (0,1/4)n‖tv 6 2‖u‖ (by Fact 4.13)
6 2‖g1‖ · d(V ,W ) 6 20
√
Bn log(Bn) · d(V ,W ) .
Noting that u +N (0,1/4)n =N (u,1/4)n, it follows
‖P ⊥V g1 +N (0,1/4)n − P ⊥W g1 +N (0,1/4)n‖tv = ‖N (u,1/4)n −N (0,1/4)n‖tv
6 20
√
Bn log(Bn) · d(V ,W ) .
Finally, since the condition ‖g1‖ 6 10
√
Bn log(Bn) has probability 1− 1/(Bn)5, removing it can
only increase the statistical distance of the two variables by additive 1/(Bn)5. 
5 An Adaptive Reconstruction Attack
We next state and prove our main theorem. It shows that no function f : Rn → {0,1} that
depends only on a lower dimensional subspace can correctly predict the `22-norm up to a
factor B on a polynomial number of adaptively chosen inputs. Here, B can be any factor and
the complexity of our attack will depend on B and the dimension of the subspace. We will
in fact show a more powerful distributional result. This result states that no such function
can predict the `22-norm on a rather natural sequence of distributions even if we allow the
function to err on each distribution with inverse polynomial probability. This distributional
strengthening will be useful in our application to compressed sensing later on. The next
definition formalizes the way in which a linear sketch will fail under our attack.
Definition 5.1 (Failure certificate). Let B > 8 and let f : Rn→ {0,1}. We say that a pair (V ,σ2)
is a d-dimensional failure certificate for f if V ⊆Rn is d-dimensional subspace and σ2 ∈ [0,2B]
such that for some constant C > 0, we have n > d + 10C log(Bn) and moreover:
– Either σ2 ∈ [B/2,50B] and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) = 1} 6 1− (Bn)−C ,
– or σ2 6 2 and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) = 1} > n−C .
The motivation for the previous definition is given by the next simple fact showing that
a failure certificate always gives rise to a distribution over which f does not decide the
GapNorm problem up to a factor Ω(B) on a polynomial number of queries. We note that
in Section 5.3 we strengthen this concept to give a distribution where f errs with constant
probability.
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Fact 5.2. Given a d-dimensional failure certificate for f , we can find with poly(Bn) non-adaptive
queries with probability 2/3 an input x such that either ‖x‖2 > B(n − d)/3 and f (x) = 0 or
‖x2‖ 6 3(n− d) and f (x) = 1.
Proof. Sample O((Bn)C) queries from G(V ⊥,σ2). Suppose σ2 6 2. Since n− d is sufficiently
large compared to d, by a union bound and Gaussian concentration, we have that with high
probability simultaneously for all queries x, ‖x‖2 6 3(n− d). On the other hand, with high
probability, f outputs 1 on one of the queries. The case where σ2 > B/2 follows with the
analogous argument. 
Our next theorem shows that we can always find a failure certificate with a polynomial
number of queries.
Theorem 5.3 (Main). Let B > 8. Let A ⊆ Rn be a r-dimensional subspace of Rn such that
n > r + 90log(Br). Assume that B 6 poly(n). Let f : Rn→ {0,1} satisfying f (x) = f (PAx) for all
x ∈Rn. Then, there is an algorithm that given only oracle access to f finds with probability 9/10 a
failure certificate for f . The time and query complexity of the algorithm is bounded by poly(B,r).
Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled from G(V ⊥,σ2) for some V ⊆Rn and
σ2 ∈ (0,B].
We next describe the algorithm promised in Theorem 5.3 in Figure 2.
5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.3
Proof. We may assume without loss of generality that n = r + 90log(Br) by working with the
first r + 90log(Br) coordinates of Rn. This ensures that a polynomial dependence on n in our
algorithm is also a polynomial dependence on r.
For each 1 6 t 6 t, let Wt ⊆ A be the closest (t − 1)-dimensional subspace to Vt that is
contained in A. Formally, Wt satisfies
d(Vt ,Wt) = min{d(Vt ,W ) : dim(W ) = t − 1,W ⊆ A} . (11)
Note that here we identify Vt with the subspace that is spanned by the vectors contained in
Vt . We will maintain (with high probability) that the following invariant is true during the
attack:
Invariant at step t:
dim(Vt) = t − 1 and d(Vt ,Wt) 6 t20(Bn)3.5 log(Bn)2.5 . (12)
Note that the invariant holds vacuously at step 1, since V1 = {0} ⊆ A. Informally speaking, our
goal is to show that either the algorithm terminates with a failure certificate or the invariant
continues to hold. Note that whenever the invariant holds in a step t, we must have
d(Vt ,Wt) 6
1
20B3.5n2.5 log(Bn)2.5
.
Hence, Lemma 4.14 shows that for every σ2 ∈ (0,B],
‖G(V ⊥t ,σ2)−G(W⊥t ,σ2)‖tv 6 20
√
Bn log(Bn) · d(Vt ,Wt) + 1(Bn)5 6
1
B3n2 log(Bn)2
. (13)
This observation leads to the following useful lemma.
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Input: Oracle A providing access to a function f : Rn→ {0,1}, parameter B > 4.
Attack: Let V1 = {0},m = O(B13n11 log15(n)), and S = [3/4,B] ∩ εZ where ε =
1/20(Bn)2 log(Bn).
For t = 1 to t = r + 1 :
1. For each σ2 ∈ S :
(a) Sample g1, . . . , gm ∼ G(V ⊥t ,σ2). Query A on each gi . Let ai =A(gi).
(b) Let s(t,σ2) = 1m
∑m
i=1 ai denote the fraction of samples that are positively labeled.
– If either σ2 > B/2 and s(t,σ2) 6 1−ε, or, σ2 6 2 and s(t,σ2) > ε, then terminate
and output (V ⊥t ,σ2) as a purported failure certificate.
– Else let g ′1, . . . , g ′m′ be the vectors such that A(gi) = 1 for all i ∈ [m′].
(c) If m′ < m/100B2n, proceed to the next σ. Else, compute vσ ∈Rn as the maximizer
of the objective function z(v) = 1m′
∑m′
i=1〈v,g ′i 〉2.
2. Let v∗ denote the first vector vσ that achieved objective function (σ2 + 1/4) +∆ where
∆ = 1/7Br.
– If no such vσ was found, let Vt+1 = Vt and proceed to the next round.
– Else let vt = v∗ −
∑
v∈Vt v〈v,v∗〉‖∑v∈Vt v〈v,v∗〉‖ and put Vt+1 = Vt ∪ {vt} .
Figure 2: Reconstruction Attack on Linear Sketches. The algorithm iteratively builds a subspace Vt
that is approximately contained in the unknown subspace A. In each round the algorithm queries A
on a sequence of queries chosen from the orthogonal complement of Vt . As the dimension of Vt grows
larger, the oracle must make a mistake.
Lemma 5.4. Assume that the invariant holds at step t. Then, if f is (α,B)-correct on V ⊥t , then f
is (α + ε,B)-correct on W⊥t .
Proof. Equation 14 implies that for every σ2 ∈ (0,B], the statistical distance betweenG(V ⊥t ,σ2)
and G(W⊥t ,σ2) is at most ε. Hence, the correctness conditions from Definition 4.10 hold up
to an ε-loss in the probabilities. 
Let E denote the event that the empirical estimate s(t,σ2) is accurate at all steps of the
algorithm. Formally:
∀t∀σ2 ∈ S :
∣∣∣∣∣∣s(t,σ2)− PG(V ⊥t ,σ2) {f (g) = 1}
∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6 ε .
Lemma 5.5. P {E} > 1− exp(−n).
Proof. The claim follows from a standard application of the Chernoff bound, since we chose
the number of samples m (Bn/ε)2 . 
Lemma 5.6. Under the condition that E occurs, the following is true: If the algorithm terminates
in round t and outputs G(V ⊥t ,σ2), then G(V ⊥t ,σ2) is a failure certificate for f . Moreover, if the
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algorithm does not terminate in round t and the invariant holds in round t, then f is B-correct on
W⊥.
Proof. The first claim follows directly from the definition of a failure certificate and the
condition that the empirical error given by s(t,σ2) is ε-close to the actual error.
The second claim follows from Lemma 5.4. Indeed by the condition E and the assumption
that the algorithm did not terminate, we must have that f is (2ε,B)-correct on V ⊥t . By
Lemma 5.4, this implies that f is (3ε,B)-correct on W⊥t . Note that 3ε 6 1/10(Bn)2 and hence
f is correct on W⊥t . 
The next lemma is crucial as it shows that the invariant continues to hold with high
probability assuming that f continues to be correct.
Lemma 5.7 (Progress). Let t 6 r. Assume that the invariant holds in round t and that f is
B-correct on W⊥t . Then, with probability 1− 1/n2 the invariant holds in round t + 1.
We will carry out the proof of Lemma 5.7 in Section 5.2. But before we do so we will
conclude the proof of Theorem 5.3 assuming that the previous lemma holds. In order to
do so, we argue that if we reach the final round and the invariant holds, we have effectively
reconstructed all of A. Hence, it must be the case that f is no longer correct on W⊥t as shown
next.
Lemma 5.8. Suppose that the invariant holds for t = r + 1. Then, f is not B-correct on Wt .
Proof. Since t = r + 1 and the invariant holds, we have dim(Vt) = dim(Wt) = r. On the other
hand Wt ⊆ A and dim(A) = r. Hence, Wt = A. Therefore, the function f cannot distinguish
between samples from G(W⊥t ,2) and samples from G(W⊥t ,B). Thus, f must make a mistake
with constant probability on one of the distributions. 
Condition on the event that E occurs. Since E has probability 1− exp(−n), this affects the
success probability of our algorithm only by a negligible amount. Under this condition, if
the algorithm terminates in a round t with t 6 r, then by Lemma 5.6, the algorithm actually
outputs a failure certificate for f . On the other hand, suppose that we do not terminate in
any of the rounds t 6 r. By the second part of Lemma 5.6, this means that in each round t
it must be the case that f is correct on W⊥t assuming that the invariant holds at step t. In
this case we can apply Lemma 5.7 to argue that the invariant continues to hold in round
t + 1. Since the invariant holds in step 1, it follows that if the algorithm does not terminate
prematurely, then with probability (1− 1/n2)r > 1− 1/n the invariant still holds at step r + 1.
But in this case, Wr+1 is not correct for f by Lemma 5.8 and hence by Lemma 5.6 we output
a failure certificate with probability 1− exp(−n). Combining the two possible cases, it follows
that the algorithm successfully finds a failure certificate for f with probability 1− 2/n. This
is what is required by Theorem 5.3.
It therefore only remains to argue about query complexity and running time. The query
complexity is polynomially bounded in n and hence also in r since we may assume that
n 6O(r) as previously argued. Computationally, the only non-trivial step is finding the vector
vσ that maximizes z(v) =
1
m′
∑m′
i=1〈vσ , gi〉2. We claim that this vector can be found efficiently
using singular vector computation. Indeed, let G be the m′ × n matrix that has g1, . . . , g ′m
as its rows. The top singular vector v of G, by definition, maximizes ‖Gv‖2 = ∑m′i=1〈gi ,v〉2.
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Hence, it must also maximize the z(v). This shows that the attack can be implemented in
time polynomial in r. This concludes the proof of Theorem 5.3 
5.2 Proof of the Progress Lemma (Lemma 5.7)
Let t 6 r. Assume that the invariant holds in round t. Further assume that f is B-correct on
W⊥t . Recall that under these assumptions, by Equation 14, for every σ2 ∈ (0,B],
δ
def= ‖G(V ⊥t ,σ2)−G(W⊥t ,σ2)‖tv 6 1B3n2 log(Bn)2 . (14)
Our goal is to show that with probability 1−1/n2, the invariant holds in round t+ 1. To prove
this claim we will invoke the conditional expectation lemma (Lemma 4.12) in the analysis of
our algorithm.
Lemma 5.9. Assume that f is correct on W⊥t . There exists a σ˜2 ∈ S, ∆ > 17Br and u ∈ V ⊥t ∩A such
that for g ∼ G(V ⊥t , σ˜2), we have P {f (g) = 1} > 1/60B2r and
E
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] > E [〈u,g〉2]+∆ .
Proof. By our assumption, W⊥t satisfies the assumptions of the conditional expectation
lemma (Lemma 4.12) so that there exists u ∈U =W⊥t ∩A and σ ∈ [3/4,B], such that
E
G(W⊥t ,σ2)
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] > E [〈u,g〉2]+ 14Br
and P {f (g) = 1} > 140B2r . On the other hand, by Equation 14, we know that G(W⊥t ,σ2) is
δ-statistically close to G(V ⊥t ,σ2) and that δ = o(1/B2n). We claim that therefore
E
G(V ⊥t ∩A,σ2)
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] > E [〈u,g〉2]+ 16Br (15)
and P {f (g) = 1} > 150B2r . The latter statement is immediate because f (g) ∈ {0,1} and hence
P {f (g) = 1} can differ by at most δ = o(1/B3r log(rB)) between the two distributions. This
further implies that the statistical distance between the two distributions under the condition
that f (g) = 1 can only increase by a factor of 50B2r. Formally, for every distinguishing
function R : Rn→ [0,D], we have∣∣∣∣∣∣ EG(W⊥t ,σ2)
[
R(g)
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1]− E
G(V ⊥t ∩A,σ2)
[
R(g)
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1]∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6 50B2rDδ . (16)
On the other hand, P
{
〈u,g〉2 > 10`C
}
6 exp(−`) . Hence, we can truncate 〈u,g〉2 at D =
10B log(rB) without affecting either expectation by more than o(1/Br). Hence, by Equation 16
and the fact that O(B3r log(rB))δ = o(1/Br), we have∣∣∣∣∣∣ EG(W⊥t ,σ2)
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1]− E
G(V ⊥t ∩A,σ2)
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1]∣∣∣∣∣∣ 6 o ( 1Br ) . (17)
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A similar argument shows that if we change σ2 by only o(1/B2n2) additively, Equation 17
continues to hold up to a insignificant loss in the parameters. Hence, there exists σ˜2 in our
discretization for which this claim is true. Finally, since u ∈Wt ∩A and the invariant holds
for (Vt ,Wt), we have that ‖PVtu‖ > 1− 1/B2n2. Hence, the conclusion of the lemma also holds
for some u ∈ Vt ∩A up to an additive o(1/Bn) loss in the expectation. 
Informally speaking, the previous lemma suggests that for σ˜ ∈ S, the vector vσ˜ has
exceptionally high objective value. Moreover, we need to show that any vector that has high
objective value must be very close to subspace V ⊥t ∩A. This is formally argued next. The
result follows from analyzing the top singular vector of the biased Gaussian matrix obtained
by arranging all positively labeled examples into a matrix. This analysis uses standard
techniques which we defer to Section 6 but rely on in the next lemma.
Lemma 5.10. With probability 1−exp(−n), the vector v∗ found by the algorithm in step t satisfies
‖PV ⊥t ∩Av∗‖2 > 1−
1
20(Bn)3.5 log4(Bn)
. (18)
Proof. Let z∗ = maxσ2∈S z(vσ ) denote the maximum objective value achieved by any σ in
round t of the algorithm. We will first lower bound z∗ using the information we have about
σ˜ ∗ from the previous lemma. To this end, we would next like to apply Lemma 6.3 to the
conditional distribution of g ∼ G(V ⊥t , σ˜2) conditioned on the event that f (g) = 1. Note that
g ′1, . . . , g ′m′ are uniformly sampled from this distribution. Furthermore, the probability thatA outputs 1 on each sample is at least p > Ω(1/B2n). This can be used to show that by a
Chernoff bound, with probability 1− exp(−n), we have that
m′ > pm
10
>Ω
(
B11n10 log15(n)
)
We will apply Lemma 6.3 with the following setting of γ :
γ =
1
(Bn)3.5 log4(Bn)
.
We need to verify the following conditions of Lemma 6.3. In doing so let V = V ⊥t ∩A and
W = V ⊥ = Vt +A⊥. Further, let τ = σ˜2 + 1/4 and ∆ be the parameter from Lemma 5.9.
1. Any unit vector w ∈W can be written as αv + βw′ , where α2 + β2 = 1, and v,w′ are unit
vectors with v ∈ Vt and w′ ∈ A⊥ is orthogonal to v. But E〈v,g〉2 6 1/4. Moreover, the
condition f (g) = 1 does not bias the distribution along directions inside A⊥. Hence,
E〈w′ , g〉2 6 τ. It follows that E〈w,g〉2 6 τ. Here we used that E〈w′ , g〉〈v,g〉 = 0 since g
can be written as the sum of two independent spherical gaussians and v and w′ are
orthogonal.
2. For every v ∈ V , w ∈W, we have E〈v,g〉〈w,g〉 = 0. This is again because v and w are
orthogonal and g can be written as the sum of two independent spherical Gaussians.
3. By Lemma 5.9, there exists v ∈ V such that E〈v,g〉2 > τ +∆ where ∆ > 1/7Br.
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4. Finally, for every u ∈Rn, we claim that ξ2 = V 〈u,g〉2 6O(B2 log2n) as it corresponds to
the fourth moment of a Gaussian with variance C conditioned on an event of probability
Ω(1/poly(n)). Any such event can increase the fourth moment of O(B2) by at most an
O(log2n) factor.
Finally, to apply Lemma 6.3 for the given value of γ,∆, and ξ2, we need the number of
samples to be
Θ
(
n log2(n)ξ2
γ2∆2
)
6Θ
(
B11n10 log14(n)
)
= o(m′) .
We have thus verified all conditions of Lemma 6.3. It follows that with probability 1 −
exp(−n logn),
z∗ > z(σ˜ ) > 1 + ∆
14
.
On the other hand, let us call a σ2 ∈ S, bad if for every unit vector u ∈ V ⊥t ∩A we have for
g ∼ G(V ⊥t ,σ2),
E
[
〈u,g〉2
∣∣∣∣f (g) = 1] 6 E [〈u,g〉2]+ ∆20 ,
where ∆ is the parameter from the previous lemma. We claim that every bad σ2 will achieve
strictly smaller objective value, i.e., z(σ ) 6 1+∆/18, with probability 1−exp(−n). This follows
from Theorem 6.2 similarly to how it was used in Lemma 6.3 except that we now use an
upper bound on E〈u,g〉2 also for u ∈ V ⊥t ∩A. Hence, the maximizer of the objective function
must correspond to a σ ∗ that satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 6.3 as we previously verified
them for σ˜ up to a constant factor loss in ∆. Hence, by Lemma 6.3, we must have that v∗
satisfies with probability 1− exp(−n),
‖PV ⊥t ∩Av∗‖2 > 1−γ .

Lemma 5.11. Suppose (Vt ,Wt) satisfies the Invariant and suppose the vector v∗ found in round t
satisfies Equation 18. Then, the Invariant holds for (Vt+1,Wt+1).
Proof. Let γ = 1/(Bn)3.5 log4(Bn). By Equation 18, we have that ‖PUv∗‖2 > 1−γ, where U =
V ⊥t ∩A. This means in particular that ‖PAv∗‖2 > 1−γ and ‖PVtv∗‖2 6 γ. This implies that
‖PAvt‖ > 1−O(γ) .
We claim that this implies that
d(Vt+1,Wt+1) 6 d(Vt ,Wt) +O(γ) 6
t
(Bn)3.5 log3(Bn)
+O
(
1
(Bn)3.5 log4(Bn)
)
6
t + 1
(Bn)3.5 log(Bn)3
,
for sufficiently large n. Since this is what we want to show, it only remains to show that the
first inequality holds. To that end, note that we can write PVt+1 = PVt +vtv
T
t .Moreover, we have
PWt+1 = PWt +ww
T where w is some unit vector orthogonal to Wt such that ‖vt −w‖ 6 O(γ).
Hence,
d(Vt+1,Wt+1) = ‖PVt+1 − PWt+1‖2 6 ‖PVt+1 − PWt+1‖2 + ‖vtvTt −wwT ‖2 6 d(Vt ,Wt) +O(γ) .

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We have shown that with probability 1−O(exp(−n)), the conditions of Lemma 5.11 are
met and in this case the Invariant holds for (Vt+1,Wt+1). This is what we needed to show in
order to conclude the proof of Lemma 5.7.
5.3 Finding high error certificates via direct products
In this section we derive a useful extension of our theorem. Specifically we show how to
find strong failure certificates. These will be distributions as before of the form G(V ⊥,σ2), but
now the algorithm fails with constant probability over this distribution rather than inverse-
polynomial. In fact, our later application to compressed sensing will need precisely this
extension of our theorem. The proof of this extension follows from a simple direct product
construction which shows how to reduce the error probability of the oracle at intermediate
steps exponentially while increasing the sample complexity only polynomially.
Definition 5.12 (Strong Failure Certificate). Let B > 8 and let f : Rn→ {0,1}. We say that a
pair (V ,σ2) is a d-dimensional failure certificate for f if V ⊆Rn is d-dimensional subspace and
σ2 ∈ [0,2B] such that for some constant C > 0, we have n > d + 10log(n) and moreover:
– Either σ2 ∈ [B/2,50B] and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) = 1} 6 2/3,
– or σ2 6 2 and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) = 1} > 1/3.
The next theorem states that we can efficiently find strong failure certificates.
Theorem 5.13. Let B > 8. Let A ⊆ Rn be an r-dimensional subspace of Rn such that n > r +
90log(Br). Assume that B 6 poly(n). Let f : Rn→ {0,1} satisfying f (x) = f (PAx) for all x ∈ Rn.
Then, there is an algorithm that with probability 1/3 and poly(B,r) adaptive oracle queries to f
finds a strong failure certificate for f . Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled
from G(V ⊥,σ2) for some V ⊆Rn and σ2 ∈ (0,B].
Proof. Let q = O(log(Bn)). Given the function f : Rn → {0,1} that is invariant under the
subspace A ⊆Rn, consider the function f ⊗q : Rqn→ {0,1} defined as
f ⊗q(x1,x2, . . . ,xq) = Majority(f (x1), f (x2), . . . , f (xq)) .
Note that f ⊗q is invariant under the subspace A⊗q, i.e., the q-fold direct product of A with
itself. Further note that dim(A⊗q) = qr 6 qn−90q log(Br).Hence, f ⊗q satisfies the assumptions
of Theorem 5.3.
Now, let G(W⊥,σ2) be the failure certificate returned by the algorithm guaranteed by
Theorem 5.3. Recall from Definition 4.8 that a sample g ∼ G(W⊥,σ2) satisfies g = PW⊥g1 + g2
where g1 ∼ N (0,σ2)qn and g2 ∼ N (0,1/qn)qn. Let U1, . . . ,Uq be coordinate subspaces so that
Ui corresponds to the i-th block of n coordinates in Rqn. Clearly, we have the decomposition:
PW⊥ =
q∑
i=1
PUiPW⊥ =
q∑
i=1
PUi∩W⊥ .
Moreover, the subspaces Ui ∩W⊥ are orthogonal for i , j. Since g1 is a spherical Gaussian,
this means that the random variables PUi∩W⊥g1 for i ∈ [q] are statistically independent of each
other. The same is true for PUig2. Consider therefore the distribution Gi = PUi∩W⊥g1 + PUig2
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restricted to its n nonzero coordinates, i.e., we think of Gi as a random variable in Rn. In
particular,G(W⊥,σ2) = (G1, . . . ,Gq) and we have established that this is a product distribution.
It remains to argue that each Gi has the form G(V ⊥,σ2;1/qn) for some subspace V . This is
immediate if we take V =Ui ∩W⊥ thought of as a subspace of Rn. The following fact is now
an immediate consequence of the Majority function.
Claim 5.14. If f is 9/10-correct on Gi for a set of at least 2q/3 indices i ∈ [q], then f ⊗q is
1− 1/(Bn)5 correct on G(W⊥,σ2).
Proof. For x1, . . . ,xq drawn from (G1, . . . ,Gq), the expected number of correct answers by f
on these samples is at least 2q/3 · 9/10 = 3/5. The probability that the number is below
q/2 is therefore at most exp(−Ω(q)) 6 (Bn)−5 for q = O(log(Bn)) using a standard Chernoff
bound. 
Our claim implies that f cannot be 9/10-correct on a 1/3 fraction of the distributions Gi ,
for i ∈ [q]. Outputting a random Gi hence completes the proof of theorem. 
6 Top singular vector of biased Gaussian matrices
To analyze our algorithm it was necessary to understand the top singular vector of certain
biased Gaussian matrices. In this section we will prove the necessary lemmas. We start with
a standard discretization of the unit sphere.
Lemma 6.1 (ε-net for the sphere). For every c > 0, there is a set N ⊆ Sn−1 of size |N | 6
exp(O(n log(1/c))) such that for every unit vector x ∈ Rn, there is a unit vector v ∈ N satis-
fying 〈x,v〉2 6 c.
We will need the following simple variant of the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound.
Theorem 6.2 (Chernoff-Hoeffding). Let the random variables X1, . . . ,Xm be independent random
variables. Let X =
∑m
i=1Xi and let ξ
2 = V X. Then, for any t > 0,
P {|X −EX | > t} 6 exp
(
− t
2
4ξ2
)
.
The next lemma is an application of the previous bound. We used it earlier in the proof
of Theorem 5.3.
Lemma 6.3. Let τ > 0. Let V be a subspace of Rn. Let G be distribution over Rn such that for
g ∼ G we have:
1. For every unit vector w ∈ V ⊥, we have E〈w,g〉2 6 τ.
2. For every two unit vectors v ∈ V ,w ∈ V ⊥, we have E〈v,g〉〈w,g〉 = 0.
3. The maximum ofE〈v,g〉2 over all unit vectors v ∈ V is equal to τ+∆ for some ∆ > 1/poly(n).
4. For every unit vector u ∈Rn, we have V 〈u,g〉2 6 ξ2.
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Let γ > 1/poly(n). Draw m =O
(
n log2(n)ξ2
γ2∆2
)
i.i.d. samples g1, . . . , gm ∼ G and let
u∗ = arg max
‖u‖=1
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u〉2 .
Then, with probability 1− exp(−n log2n), we have ‖PV u∗‖2 > 1−γ. Moreover,
1
m
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u∗〉2 > τ + ∆2 .
Proof. Let g1, . . . , gm ∼ G bem i.i.d. samples fromG. First consider the vector v ∈ V guaranteed
by the second assumption of the lemma. Let X =
∑
i〈v,gi〉2. We have EX > τm +∆m and
V X 6 nξ2. Hence, by Theorem 6.2,
P
{
X 6 (τ +∆)m− γm∆
4
}
6 exp
(
−∆
2γ2m2
O(ξ2m)
)
6 exp
(
−n log2n
)
.
On the other hand, let u = αv + βw with α2 + β2 = 1 be any vector such that v is a unit vector
in V and w is a unit vector in V ⊥. Further assume that α2 6 1−γ. Let Y = ∑mi=1〈u,gi〉2. Note
that
E〈u,g〉2 = α2E〈v,g〉2 + β2E〈w,g〉2 +αβE〈v,g〉〈w,g〉 = α2E〈v,g〉2 + β2E〈w,g〉2 .
Here we used the assumption that E〈v,g〉〈w,g〉 = 0. Hence,
E〈u,g〉2 = α2E〈v,g〉2 + β2E〈w,g〉2 6 (1−γ)(τ +∆) + τ/n = τ + (1−γ)∆ .
In particular, EY 6 τ + (1−γ)∆. Applying Theorem 6.2 again, we have
P
{
Y > (τ +∆)m− 3γ∆m
4
}
6 exp
(
−∆
2γ2m2
O(ξ2m)
)
6 exp
(
−n log2n
)
.
Note that there is a margin of m∆/2 between the bound on Y and the bound on X. Let
M ⊆ Sn−1 be the set M = {u : ‖PV u‖2 6 1− γ}. Further let M˜ be the set obtained from M by
replacing each member of M with its nearest point in N where N be the discretization of the
unit sphere given by Lemma 6.1 with the setting c = γ∆/8. Note that c > 1/poly(n) and hence
|N | = exp(O(n logn)). We claim that
max
u∈M
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u〉2 6max
u∈M˜
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u〉2 + γ∆m8 .
This is because each squared inner product can differ by at most γ∆/8 and there are m terms
in the summation. On the other hand, we have by a union bound,
P
maxu∈M˜
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u〉2 > (τ +∆)m− 3γ∆m4
 6 |N | ·P
{
Y > (τ +∆)m− 3γ∆n
4
}
6 exp(O(n logn))exp(−Ω(n log2n))
6 exp(−Ω(n log2(n))) .
27
We conclude that with probability 1− exp(−n log2n),
max
u∈M
m∑
i=1
〈gi ,u〉2 6 (τ +∆)m− 3γ∆m4 +
γ∆m
8
6 (τ +∆)m− 5γ∆m
8
,
and thus strictly smaller than the global maximum. This implies that the global maximizer
u∗ must satisfy ‖PV u∗‖2 > 1−γ. 
7 Applications and Extensions
In this section we derive various applications of our main theorem.
7.1 Randomized Algorithms
While we have stated our results in terms of algorithms that output a (deterministic) func-
tion f of the sketch Ax, we obtain the same results for algorithms which use additional
randomness to output a randomized function f of Ax. Indeed, the main observation is that
our attack never makes the same query twice, with probability 1. It follows that for each
possible hardwiring of the randomness of f for each possible input, we obtain a deterministic
function, and can apply Theorem 5.13.
Now consider the attack in Figure 2. In each round t, we now allow the algorithm to
use a new function ft : Rn→ {0,1} provided that ft(x) still only depends on PAx. Under this
assumption, the proof of Theorem 5.3 (and thus also the one of Theorem 5.13) carries through
the same way as before except that we replace f by ft in each round. What is crucial for the
attack is only that the subspace A has not changed.
We thus have the following theorem.
Theorem 7.1. Let B > 8. LetA ⊆Rn be a r-dimensional subspace ofRn such that n > r+90log(Br).
Assume that B 6 poly(n). Let f : Rn→ {0,1} be a randomized algorithm for which the distribution
on outputs f (x) only depends on PAx, for all x ∈Rn. Then, there is an algorithm that given only
oracle access to f , which for each possible fixing of the randomness of f , finds with constant
probability a strong failure certificate for f . The time and query complexity of the algorithm is
bounded by poly(Br). Moreover, all queries that the algorithm makes are sampled from G(V ⊥,σ2)
for some V ⊆ Rn and σ2 ∈ (0,B]. Moreover, we may assume that for each query x ∼ G(V ⊥t ,σ2)
made by the algorithm in round t, the function f is allowed to depend on V ⊥t .
7.2 Approximating `p norms
Our main theorem also applies to sketches that aim to approximate any `p-norm. A random-
ized sketch Z for the `p-approximation problem depends only on a subspace A ⊆ Rn and
given x ∈Rn aims to output a number Z(x) satisfying
‖x‖p 6 Z(x) 6 C · ‖x‖p . (19)
The next corollary shows that we can find an input on which the sketch must be incorrect.
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Corollary 7.2. Let 1 6 p 6∞. Let Z be a randomized sketching algorithm for approximating the
`p-norm which uses a subspace of dimension at most n−O(log(Cn)). Then, there is an algorithm
which, with constant probability, given only poly(Cn) oracle queries to Z(x), finds a vector x ∈Rn
which violates Equation 19.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 7.1, applied with approximation factor B =O(C2n2)
to the function f : Rn→ {0,1} which outputs 1 if Z(x) > C2n2 and 0 otherwise. The theorem
gives us a strong failure certificate from which we can find a vector x satisfying either ‖x‖2 >
8Cn and f (x) = 0, or, ‖x‖2 6 4
√
n and f (x) = 1. Using the fact that ‖x‖p/
√
n 6 ‖x‖2 6
√
n‖x‖p,
it follows that Equation 19 is violated. 
7.3 Sparse recovery with an `2/`2-guarantee
An `2/`2 sparse recovery algorithm for a given parameter k, is a randomized sketching
algorithm which given Ax, outputs a vector x′ that satisfies the approximation guarantee
‖x′−x‖2 6 C‖xtail(k)‖2.Here xtail(k) denotes xwith its top k coordinates (in magnitude) replaced
with 0. We will show how to find a vector x which causes the output x′ to violate the
approximation guarantee, for any k > 1.
Theorem 7.3. Consider any randomized `2/`2 sparse recovery algorithm with approximation
factor C 6O(
√
n), sparsity parameter k > 1, and sketching matrix consisting of r = o(n/C2) rows.
Then there is an algorithm which, with constant probability, given only oracle access to x′ finds a
vector x ∈Rn which violates the approximation guarantee with poly(n) adaptive oracle queries.
Remark 7.4. We note that in general the r = O(n/C2) restriction cannot be improved, at least
for small k, since there is an upper bound of O((n/C2) · k log(n/k)). Indeed, with O(k log(n/k))
rows, there is a deterministic procedure to compute x′ with ‖x′ − x‖22 6 4‖xtail(k)‖21. By splitting the
coordinates of x into n/C2 blocks x1, . . . ,xn/C
2
and applying this procedure on each block, the total
squared error is 4
∑
j ‖xjtail(k)‖21 6 4C2‖xtail(k)‖22, which implies ‖x′ − x‖2 6 2C‖xtail(k)‖2.
Proof. It suffices to prove the theorem for k = 1, since extending the theorem to larger k can
be done by appending k − 1 additional coordinates to the query vector, each of value +∞. We
will prove the theorem for each possible fixing of the randomness of function f , and so we
can assume the function f is deterministic.
We use the sparse recovery algorithm Alg to build an algorithm Alg′ for the GapNorm(B)
problem for some value of B = Θ(n). We will use Theorem 7.1 to argue that with constant
probability, Alg must have failed on some query in the attack. We use that in each round
poly(n) queries x are drawn from a subspace Gaussian family G(V ⊥,σ2), for certain V ⊥ and
σ which are chosen by the attacking algorithm, and vary throughout the course of the attack.
Further, we use that the function f can depend on V ⊥.
In a given round in the simulation, we have a subspace V ⊥. Let U = V ⊥ ∩ A with
dimension r ′ 6 r. Let
S =
{
i ∈ [n] | eiPV ⊥ei > (1−κ2/C2)1/2
}
,
where κ > 0 is a sufficiently small constant to be determined. Notice that tr(PV ⊥) > n− r and
eiPV ⊥ei 6 1 for all i. The following is a simple application of Markov’s bound.
Lemma 7.5. Let x = 1−α/C2 for a constant α > 0. The number z of indices i for which eiPV ⊥ei is
larger than x is at least n−C2r/α.
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Proof.
n− r =
∑
i
eiPV ⊥ei < z · 1 + (n− z) · x = (1− x)z+nx,
and so (1− x)(n− z) < r, or z > n− C2rα . 
By Lemma 7.5, for appropriate r = βn/C2, where β > 0 is a sufficiently small positive
constant depending on κ, we have that |S | > 2n/3, which holds at any round in the attack
since tr(PV ⊥) is always at least n− r.
The attack: We design a function f (Ax), which is allowed and will depend on V ⊥ (as well
as A), to solve Gap-Norm(B). Our reduction is deterministic. Here x ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2) is a query
generated during the attack given by Theorem 7.1.
Given Ax, the algorithm Alg′ first computes the set S with |S | > 2n/3 with eiPV ⊥ei >
(1−κ2/C2)1/2 for all i ∈ S. Notice that S depends only on V ⊥. For i ∈ S, let yi = x+4C√nPV ⊥ei .
Given V ⊥ and Ax (and A), Alg′ can compute Ayi = Ax+ 4C
√
nAPV ⊥ei .
Let zi be the output of Alg run on input Ayi , for each i ∈ S. If |zii | > C
√
n for all i ∈ S, then
Alg′ sets f (x) = 0, otherwise it sets f (x) = 1.
We assume for all queries x and all σ chosen during the attack, that ‖x‖22 ∈ [nσ2/2,2nσ2],
which happens with probability 1 − 1/nω(1) by standard concentration bounds for the χ2-
distribution. To analyze this reduction, we distinguish two cases for which we require
correctness for f .
Case 1: ‖x‖22 < 4n. By concentration bounds of the χ2-distribution, we can assume σ2 6 8.
Let i ∈ S and consider yi . Then,
‖yitail(1)‖2 6 ‖yi − 4C
√
n(eTi PV ⊥ei)ei‖2
6 ‖x‖2 + 4C
√
n(1− (eiPV ⊥ei)2)1/2
6 2
√
n+ 4C
√
n(1− (
√
1−κ2/C2)2)1/2
6 2
√
n+ 4κ
√
n
= (2 + 4κ)
√
n.
By correctness of Alg, it follows that for the output zi of Alg, we have
‖zi − yi‖2 6 C(2 + 4κ)
√
n. (20)
This implies that zii must be at least C
√
n. Indeed, otherwise we would have
‖zi − yi‖2 > |zii − yii | > 4C
√
n
√
1−κ2/C2 − |xi | −C
√
n > 2.5C
√
n,
contradicting (20) for κ a sufficiently small constant (and C at least a sufficiently large
constant, which we can assume since it only weakens the correctness requirement of Alg).
Note that we can assume Alg is correct on a query x ∼ G(V ⊥,σ ) (as otherwise we are
already done), Hence, zii must be at least C
√
n simultaneously for every i ∈ S, with probability
at least 1− 1/ns for arbitrarily large s. We thus have:
P
x∼G(V ⊥,σ2)
{
f (x) = 0 | ‖x‖22 < 4n
}
> 1− 1
ns
, (21)
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Case 2: Bn/4 6 ‖x‖22 6 100Bn, for a parameter B = Θ(n). Recall that x is obtained by
sampling g1 ∼N (0,σ2)n, g2 ∼N (0,1/4)n, and setting x = PV ⊥g1 + g2. Recall that U = V ⊥ ∩A,
so that we have PAx = PUg1 + PAg2. We can assume that σ2 >
B
8 , as mentioned above, by tail
bounds on the χ2-distribution.
Associate U with an r ′ ×n orthonormal matrix (r ′ 6 r) whose rows span U . Since the rows
of U are orthonormal, ‖U‖2F 6 r ′, and so by averaging, for at least 2n/3 of its columns Uj , we
have ‖Uj‖22 6 3r ′/n 6 3r/n. Let T = {j | ‖Uj‖22 6 3r/n}.
Fix a j ∈ T , and consider y = x + 4C√nPV ⊥ej . For x ∼ G(V ⊥,σ2), we start by upper
bounding the variation distance between the distributions of random variables PAx = PUg1 +
PAg2 and PAy = PAx+4C
√
nPA ·PV ⊥ej = PUg1 +4C
√
nPU ej+PAg2. The variation distance cannot
decrease by fixing g2, so it suffices to upper bound the variation distance between PUg1
and PUg1 + 4C
√
nPU ej . Since PU is a projection matrix, there is a 1-to-1 map from these
distributions to Ug1 and Ug1 + 4C
√
nUej , so we upper bound the variation distance between
the latter two distributions.
By rotational invariance of the Gaussian distribution, Ug1 ∼ N (0,σ2Idr ′ ), while Ug1 +
4C
√
nUej ∼N (4C
√
nUj ,σ
2Idr ′ ), where Uj is the j-th column of U . Applying Fact 4.13, and
using σ2 > B/8,
‖N (0,σ2Idr ′ )−N (4C
√
nUj ,σ
2Idr ′ )‖tv 6
4C
√
n · ‖Uj‖2
σ
6
√
8 · 4C√n · √3r/n√
B
=
8
√
6C
√
βn/C2√
B
=
8
√
6
√
nβ√
B
.
By the triangle inequality, for any j, j ′ ∈ T ,
‖N (4C√nUj ,σ2Idr ′ )−N (4C
√
nUj ′ ,σ
2Idr ′ )‖tv 6
16
√
6
√
nβ√
B
,
and so the variation distance between the distributions of random variables PA(x+4C
√
nPV ⊥ej )
and PA(x+4C
√
nPV ⊥ej ′ ) is at most
16
√
6
√
nβ√
B
. For any constant γ > 0, we can choose the constant
β sufficiently small so that for B = γ2n, this variation distance is at most 1/100. We fix such a
β, for a γ to be determined below.
Fix an i ∈ S∩T . Consider the output zi of Alg given Ayi . Using that ‖x‖2 6 10
√
Bn = 10γn,
we have
‖yitail(1)‖2 6 ‖yi − 4C
√
n(eTi PV ⊥ei)ei‖2
6 ‖x‖2 + 4C
√
n(1− (eiPV ⊥ei)2)1/2
6 10γn+ 4C
√
n(1− (
√
1−κ2/C2)2)1/2
6 10γn+ 4κ
√
n.
If Alg succeeds,
‖zi‖2 6 ‖yi‖2 +C‖yitail(1)‖2
6 ‖x‖2 + 4C
√
n+C(10γn+ 4κ
√
n)
6 10γn+ 4C
√
n+ 10Cγn+ 4κC
√
n
6 ζCn,
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where ζ > 0 is a constant that can be made arbitrarily small by making γ > 0 arbitrarily small
(and assuming n large enough). Hence, ‖zi‖22 6 ζ2C2n2. It follows that |zij | > C
√
n for at most
ζ2n values of j. Now we use the following facts if Alg succeeds.
1. |S | > 2n/3,
2. |T | > 2n/3,
3. for all i, zi contains at most ζ2n values of j for which |zij | > C
√
n
4. for any j, j ′ ∈ T , the variation distance between the distributions of random variables
PA(x+ 4C
√
nPV ⊥ej ) and PA(x+ 4C
√
nPV ⊥ej ′ ) is at most 1/100.
The first and second conditions imply that |S ∩ T | > 2n/3−n/3 = n/3. The third and fourth
conditions imply that for any i ∈ S ∩ T , if Alg succeeds (which we can assume), then
P
x∼G(V ⊥,σ2)
{
|zii | > C
√
n
}
6 P
j∈S∩T Px∼G(V ⊥,σ2)
{
|zij | > C
√
n
}
+
1
100
6
ζ2n
n/3
+
1
100
<
1
10
,
where the last inequality follows for sufficiently small constant ζ > 0. Hence,
P
x∼G(V ⊥,σ )
{
f (x) = 0 | Bn/4 6 ‖x‖22 6 100Bn
}
<
1
10
. (22)
Combining, (21) and (22), for sufficiently large n we have for all V ⊥ and σ chosen throughout
the course of the attack,
P
x∼G(V ⊥,σ2)
{
(f (x) = 1∧ ‖x‖2 < 4n)∨ (f (x) = 0∧Bn/4 6 ‖x‖22 6 100Bn)
}
<
1
10
.
Wrap-up: We have built a function f for Gap-Norm(B) which has distributional error
less than 1/10 on G(V ⊥,σ2) for any V ⊥ and σ chosen throughout the course of the attack,
whenever ‖x‖22 < 4n or Bn/4 6 ‖x‖22 6 100Bn. The reduction is deterministic and holds for each
setting of the randomness of f . It follows by Theorem 7.1, that with constant probability, with
poly(n) adaptive oracle queries to f , we will find a strong failure certificate (V ,σ2) for f (for
each fixing of its randomness). In this case, either σ2 > B/2 and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) = 1} 6 2/3,
which would violate (22), or σ2 6 2 and Pg∼G(V ⊥,σ2) {f (g) , 0} > 1/3, which would violate
(21). It follows that our assumption that the compressed sensing algorithm Alg succeeded
on all queries made was false, which implies that we have found a query to Alg violating its
approximation guarantee. This completes the proof. 
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